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abstract: This article examines reactions to the October 2005 publication of the 
Prophet Muhammad cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. It does so by 
using the concept of ‘liquid racism’. While the controversy arose because it is 
considered blasphemous by many Muslims to create images of the Prophet 
Muhammad, the article argues that the meaning of the cartoons is multidimensional, 
that their analysis is significantly more complex than most commentators 
acknowledge, and that this complexity can best be addressed via the concept of liquid 
racism. The article examines the liquidity of the cartoons in relation to four readings. 
These see the cartoons as: (1) a criticism of Islamic fundamentalism; (2) blasphemous 
images; (3) Islamophobic and racist; and (4) satire and a defence of freedom of 
speech. Finally, the relationship between postmodernity and the rise of 
fundamentalism is discussed because the cartoons, reactions to them, and Islamic 
fundamentalism, all contain an important postmodern dimension. 
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Twelve cartoons depicting the Islamic Prophet Muhammad were originally published 
in the conservative Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. The 
events that followed have been widely documented. This article examines what has 
not been unpacked, the specific detail of the incongruous and rhetorical structure of 
the cartoons and the effect this had on the debates and reactions that followed. I argue 
that the incongruity of the cartoons encourages tension and debate in a linguistic 
frame that does not allow for a clear outcome or ‘winner’. 
It is necessary to add an early caveat – some contextual definition of the terms 
‘cartoon’ and ‘satire’ – as both are used in a strictly descriptive rather than normative 
sense. The term ‘cartoon’ is employed while not assuming that the Prophet 
Muhammad cartoons are humorous to all, or anyone. Rather, I use ‘cartoon’ to 
describe the images because they were broadly created with the use of structural 
incongruity, drawn by an artist, and appeared as political artwork in a newspaper that 
regularly publishes such drawings. Of course, many cartoons that appear in daily 
newspapers are not funny to all, are offensive to their subject and rely heavily on 
ridicule as a trope. Furthermore, and as is discussed later, my use of ‘satire’ is 
descriptive. It signifies a broad category of political humour and lampooning, rather 
than a ‘noble art’ that highlights wrongdoing or shows ‘truth to power’. Although not 
usually acknowledged in such debates, satire is entwined with partisan outlooks and 
is often an ambiguous art form. 
The events that followed the publication of the cartoons included a series of 
protests from Danish Muslims, subsequent reprinting of the cartoons in over 50 
countries and the escalation of protest, with violent protest occurring in some Muslim 
countries (Butler, 2006). The cartoons were published with an article by the Jyllands-
Posten culture editor Flemming Rose, which discussed freedom of speech and self-
censorship, and explained how the Danish writer Kåre Bluitgen had difficulty finding 
an illustrator to draw Muhammad for a children’s book. The article also reported ‘that 
a local comedian said he didn’t dare make fun of the Koran’ (Whittam Smith, 2006). 
The controversy was escalated by a delegation of Danish imams touring the Middle 
East to lobby governments. This impacted on Denmark with the closure of a number 
of Arab embassies and a consumer boycott of Danish products in the Middle East. 
Reaction also included government-organized rioting in some Muslim countries, 
which resulted in a number of deaths (Butler, 2006). The Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and Arab League requested that the UN enact sanctions against Denmark 
and introduce blasphemy laws. The Danish lobbyists had presented a dossier in the 
Middle East titled ‘Dossier about Championing the Prophet Muhammad Peace be 
Upon Him’ (Hansen, 2006a: 9), which included the 12 cartoons and, it was reported, 
‘three additional cartoons of unknown origin: one shows Mohamed with a pig’s 
snout, one shows the Prophet as a dangerous paedophile and the third shows a 
Muslim at prayer being buggered by a dog’ (Lawson, 2006). It was later revealed that 
the image containing the pig’s snout was in fact a contestant at a French, not Danish, 
pig-squealing contest and had nothing to do with insulting Islam (Hansen, 2006a: 9). 
The dossier also included ‘pictures from another Danish newspaper, anti-Muslim hate 
mail, a televised interview with Dutch member of parliament Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 
who received the Freedom Prize from the Danish Liberal Party’ (Hansen, 2006a: 9), 
and is a regular critic of misogynistic uses of Islam. In February 2008, the cartoons 
were reprinted by several Danish newspapers, including Jyllands-Posten, in response 
to the arrest of three people accused of plotting to murder Kurt Westergaard, who 
penned the bomb/turban cartoon (Olsen, 2008). 
The 12 cartoons are all very different and only the most rigid of readings could 
argue they are equally offensive, blasphemous, racist or Islamophobic. So, for 
example, one of the cartoons simply shows Muhammad with a stick, walking through 
a desert. This is perhaps the only one that does not contain an incongruity. Another is 
benign towards all versions of Islam that understand irony. As Hansen explains, ‘One 
was a subtle attack on the paper itself: in it, Muhammed is not the Prophet but rather a 
young boy, a second generation migrant. He points to the chalkboard script: “The 
editorial team of Jyllands-Posten is a bunch of reactionary provocateurs” ’ (Hansen, 
2006a: 8). Similarly, one depicts Kåre Bluitgen in a turban, holding a stick figure of 
Muhammad, as an orange inscribed with ‘publicity stunt’ falls into the turban. As a 
report explained, ‘The proverb “an orange in the turban” is a Danish expression 
meaning “stroke of luck”: here, the added publicity for the book’ (Anon., 2006). 
Bleich (2006: 17) also comments on the diversity of the cartoons and states: ‘it is not 
true that the cartoons universally contribute to Muslims’ ethno-racial outsider status’. 
It is, therefore, fairly implausible to argue that three of the 12 cartoons are offensive 
or racist. They are, however, not all equally benign. 
The humour theorist Arthur Asa Berger claims that ‘it is much easier to ridicule 
someone, to make allusions about someone’s transgressions and crimes, and to 
express contempt and loathing for someone visually by using caricature than it is in 
prose’ (Berger, 1995: 144). The two cartoons generally considered most offensive 
draw on this potential. The first shows a sketch of Muhammad with a bomb in his 
turban. The second shows Muhammad with his eyes blacked out and holding a sword. 
Two women stand behind him wearing burkhas that only allow their eyes to be seen. 
It is an important point, and one omitted from most commentaries, that a satirical 
cartoon is necessarily constructed with an incongruity or with a contrast, and that this 
incongruity encourages a number of ambiguous readings. In the first of the offensive 
cartoons, the image of Muhammad is juxtaposed with the image of a terrorist bomb 
and creates an incongruity because bombs are not worn in turbans. The second 
offensive cartoon plays on the prohibition of depicting Muhammad by showing him 
with his identity obscured. The mark of the censor on Muhammad’s face becomes the 
focus of the incongruity, in contrast to the women behind him who have everything 
but their eyes obscured. This forms a visual opposition or incongruity that mocks both 
the prohibition of depicting Muhammad and the concept of women wearing burkhas. 
These incongruities lead to various reactions because they do not create a literal or 
denotative meaning. They set up chains of connotation and create the ‘liquidity’ of 
the images (for a commensurate account of the contextual ambiguity of visuals, see 
Müller et al., 2009). 
Liquidity is an appropriate term for discursive meaning that is ambiguous. Zygmunt 
Bauman argues the ‘ “Liquid modern” is a society in which the conditions under 
which its members act change faster than it takes the ways of acting to consolidate 
into habits and routines’ (Bauman, 2005: 1). Such liquidity is characteristic of 
postmodernity, with its increase in the occurrence and experience of ambivalence.1 I 
propose that postmodern tendencies are exhibited in the structure and appearance of 
certain instances of racism, in what I call ‘liquid racism’. 
Liquid Racism 
The existence of ambivalence and contradiction in the proximity of racist expression 
has been documented in the social sciences (e.g. Billig et al., 1988; Rattansi, 2007: 
118, 120). This has led Rattansi to argue that there can be no essentialized racist 
subject (Rattansi, 2007: 118). Such research suggests that because subjects often 
negotiate contradictory discourses, some racist and some non-racist, a singular racist 
subjectivity is difficult to identify. I argue elsewhere that traditional forms of racist 
humour can act as rhetorical devices that resolve the ambiguities of racism and so aid 
the task of negotiation (Weaver, 2007). We see later that certain readings of the 
cartoons are involved in this process. By developing the concept of ‘liquid racism’, I 
would like to move the discussion of racism and ambivalence ‘away’ from the 
proximity of the subject, to show how certain cultural signs can contain the ability to 
produce simultaneous and ambiguous racist and non-racist readings. 
Liquid racism is a racism generated by ambiguous cultural signs that encourages 
the development of entrenched socio-discursive positioning, alongside reactions to 
racism, when reading these signs. The images are ambiguous because they combine 
the signs of older racisms alongside those of political and social issues that are not 
necessarily racist. The development of entrenched positioning occurs because, and as 
is unpacked later, the ambiguity of the images create and encourage fundamentalist 
reactions.2 Reactions to the images as racism occur as the reader connects primarily 
with the signs of older racisms. 
The term ‘liquid racism’ gives the impression that we are now faced with a racism 
whose structure has changed and is obviously less solid than traditional racisms. The 
metaphor can be unpacked significantly. Bauman describes the ‘liquid modern’ as a 
society without solid patterns or routines, under processes of constant change that 
have accelerated. It is a society where the meaning of identities, objects and ‘others’ 
frequently shift position and mutate. Bauman does not discuss racism in detail in his 
corpus on liquid modernity and so I wish to develop the term ‘liquid racism’ to 
identify cultural signs that exhibit some of the tendencies of post/liquid modernity. 
Liquid racism is generated by interactions between the sophisticated rhetoric of 
racism in society, the complexity and diversity of ethnic identity and continuous 
population movements. 
Liquid drastically loses its shape when it is removed from its ‘container’. This 
suggests that liquid racism is one that needs a ‘container’ in which to be viewed, yet 
cannot produce a monolithic reading. Individual subjects may, therefore, develop 
particular semantic containers according to context and circumstance. Structurally, an 
increase in the ‘volume’ of sign-slippage in liquid racism allows for no 
straightforward way of establishing or asserting any semantic superiority of 
interpretation, making critique more challenging. Liquid racism has a malleable form 
that has far more potential for ambiguity, and this, we will see, paradoxically encour-
ages and polarizes fixed readings. Rattansi (2007: 122) describes the ‘polarised 
shouting matches from entrenched positions’ that often appear in debates of racism. 
These are common around liquid racism. The content of liquid racism is constructed 
through the referents of cultural racism and embodied racism but the increased 
volume of its assemblage will create many potential readings, and this will affect its 
overall definitions of the ‘other’ which are multiple and protean. 
The increased ambivalence of liquid racism means that it may be difficult to define, 
or that its definition may shift. This does not mean that such formations are not 
experienced by social actors as racism, as older forms of racism are. In many 
instances, because of its structural ambiguity, the impact may not be taken seriously 
because it is invisible from certain perspectives. This continues the development of 
immunity to criticism exhibited in the shift to postwar, postcolonial, cultural racism. 
The concept of liquid racism presents two questions: is liquid racism really a new 
racism or just older racisms hiding themselves better? If liquid racism is genuinely 
more open then the argument surely suggests itself that it is not racism at all, or is a 
weakened and challenged residue of racism? To answer the first question, liquid 
racism uses both embodied and culturally racist signs but it is more ambiguous and 
contains more semantic layers. Further research will uncover the extent of liquid 
racism, both socially and historically, and so its newness is open to more complex 
readings. It certainly appears ‘new’ in terms of structure but decidedly old in terms of 
content. Bauman’s thesis on liquid modernity suggests there are socio-semantic 
formations that proliferate in a global age, that are perhaps new in terms of the level 
of complexity of readings generated. 
On the second question, liquid racism should not be seen as a specifically weakened 
or challenged residue of racism but rather as an ambiguous form that is specifically 
encouraged nowadays and one that weakens various defences against claims of 
racism. It is a form of racism that is promoted and encouraged by the mass media. It 
is ambiguous but, crucially, this ambiguity has, in part, encouraged media interest. In 
an age of interactive and polyvocal media, liquid racism generates a ‘debate’, 
providing more material and more positions to debate because it is ambiguous. 
Traditional monosemic racism fails to provide this potential and so is less media 
friendly or malleable and less open to exploitation for media content. Liquid racism 
also leads to the specific staging of proteophobic and proteophilic oppositions in 
media debate – all social actors need to do is take a side. It remains that many social 
actors do not ‘read’ liquid racism in its complexity, and so, as is explained later, it is 
as much reader interpretation and (lack of) reflexivity, as well as the expression of 
liquid racism, that is in need of critique. 
 
Four Readings of the Cartoons 
In creating this liquidity, descriptions of the cartoons (which focus on the two deemed 
most offensive) give them several meanings, which can coexist because of the 
incongruity or ambiguity of the visual images. These can be summarized as: 
1. The cartoons are a criticism of Islamic fundamentalism. 
2. The cartoons are blasphemous because they depict Muhammad, so are insulting to 
Muslims and an attack on Islam. 
3. The cartoons suggest Muhammad is a terrorist and thus imply that Muslims are 
terrorists by association. This stereotype is Islamophobic and racist. 
4. The cartoons are satirical and should be defended under the principle of freedom of 
speech 
Most reactions to the cartoons see one reading and develop it as the most valid, or 
regard one reading as the most offensive. Some take one reading as the most 
politically expedient and so construct a rhetorical argument for the realism of that 
reading and against its opponents (e.g. Hervik, 2008, in relation to reading 3). Such 
accounts do not read the cartoons as signs that exist in a specific semiotic ‘frame’ and 
most do not consider issues of polysemia in relation to any particular reading of the 
cartoons. Such readings inflict erasure on each other and encourage the liquidity of 
the controversy. 
A Criticism of Islamic Fundamentalism 
The first reading, a criticism of Islamic fundamentalism, is developed in the 
comments of Westergaard, the cartoonist of the bomb/turban cartoon, and by Rose. In 
explaining his ‘stated’ meaning, Westergaard argues: 
 
The cartoon is not about Islam as a whole, but the part that 
apparently can inspire violence, terrorism, death and destruction. 
And thereby the fundamentalist part of Islam. I wanted to 
demonstrate that terrorists get their spiritual ammunition from Islam. 
There are interpretations of it that are incorrect. The general 
impression among Muslims is that it is about Islam as a whole. It is 
not. (Westergaard, 2006) 
 
Westergaard insists that the bomb/turban cartoon should not be read as racist and 
Islamophobic. In line with this, but with a less specific focus, the 12 cartoons 
surround an article on self-censorship and freedom of speech. The comments of 
Flemming Rose illuminate the sentiment of the article and express a reading close to 
Westergaard’s: 
The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They 
demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their 
own religious feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary 
democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put 
up with insults, mockery and ridicule. (Rose, 2005) 
These statements are described as the ‘stated’ rather than the ‘intended’ meaning for 
two reasons. First, the cartoonists and Rose, in anticipation of the proceeding debate 
and protest, had an interest in presenting a particular form of intentionality that might 
disguise the thoughts or motives behind the piece. Put simply, any anti-Muslim or 
broadly racist motivation would be downplayed. Second, the individuals involved 
may not have been completely aware of their own intentionality when they created 
the cartoons. Freud’s (1991 [1905]) theory of joking offers a number of insights that 
aid this discussion. Freud argued that humour results from a nervous release of 
energy, and that jokes often have a similar function to dreams or slips of the tongue 
because they represent the expression of repressed thoughts, or thoughts that are not 
socially acceptable as serious discourse. For Freud, tendentious jokes either express 
hostility, aggression or have a sexual content, which includes most jokes that generate 
insult. Freud considered there to be an element of self-denial in tendentious humour, 
that the joke involves an act of self-deception by the joker. This suggests inten-
tionality is an ambiguous concept and one difficult to prove. 
Much has been said on the conservative politics of Jyllands-Posten (Bleich, 2006; 
Carens, 2006; Hervik, 2008; Modood, 2006a, 2006b), and it seems obvious that the 
cartoons were intended to provoke a reaction from some Muslims at some level, as 
well as offending their religious sensibilities. While conservative journalists have 
equal rights of expression, of course, the comments of Rose do paint a stereotypical 
image of Muslims in Europe, although he is careful to only accuse ‘some Muslims’. 
As a conservative newspaper, Jyllands-Posten may have seen the exercise as a 
worthwhile task, for the greater good as they see it.  
I do not make an argument for censoring the cartoons or other instances of 
offensive satire. Censoring satire would likely prove self-defeating and encourage 
increasingly coded forms of racist expression, and where racism is debated or 
ambiguous, might lead to a subtle authoritarianism. Moreover, discussions of censure 
in the debates that followed seemed to miss the point of the initial article on self-
censorship (e.g. Modood, 2006a, 2006b). Most commentators also fail to mention that 
the structural ambiguity of satire complicates a comparison with hate speech (cf. 
Bleich, 2006). Humour, while not always funny, is a linguistic or visual frame that 
differs from serious communication. It is difficult to convincingly argue that it could 
be censored on the grounds of it being intended to generate specific serious reactions. 
Despite this, humour does support racism, and it is possible to outline the rhetorical 
potential of such images, and to argue that humour is often more than ‘just humour’. 
The ‘seriousness’ of humour is such that its rhetorical effects are often more pointed 
because they are ambiguous and difficult to place inside categories such as hate 
speech. The stated meaning of the cartoons gives no basis on which to accuse anyone 
of hate speech, and while hate speech legislation often focuses on effect, on speech 
that might stir up hatred, the target is not usually the speaker. In the case of the 
cartoons controversy, those involved in their production received threats while there 
was a notable absence of any obvious cases of incitement of hatred or violence 
towards Muslims (Ammitzbøll and Vidino, 2007). 
Blasphemous Images 
The ‘blasphemous reading’, the idea that the cartoons are an insult to Islam, appears 
in both direct protest and commentary. In outlining it, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown offers a 
description of the outrage caused by the cartoons: ‘Flemming Rose . . . sought out 
controversial cartoonists to create caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed, not because 
they had something bold and compelling to say, but simply to enrage, like bullfighters 
goading a bull’ (Alibhai-Brown, 2006). Hansen explains how in October 2005, 
‘Muslim organisations in Denmark filed a complaint against the paper, claiming the 
publication constituted blasphemy under a rarely invoked section of the Danish 
criminal code’ (Hansen, 2006a: 9). The blasphemous reading also gained purchase in 
Muslim countries where the dossier was publicized and unrest provoked. An example 
is reported by Katherine Butler: ‘the sense of outrage at what is being depicted as an 
orchestrated Western assault on Muslim sensibilities, appears to cut across Pakistani 
society’ (Butler, 2006). She adds ‘Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, the 
President’s spokesman, said the “blasphemous sketches” could be “detrimental to 
world peace. . . . Moderate or non-practising Muslims are as one on this. It is like 
shoving pork down our throat” ’ (Butler, 2006). These extracts highlight one reading 
of the cartoons, as they develop as a trope that holds both anti-western prejudice and 
offence at blasphemy. 
There are different interpretations inside this reading. Some see the cartoons as a 
comment on the state of civilized society. These argue that because the cartoons show 
a lack of respect towards the faith of Muslims they are not reflective of ideal 
discourse in a civilized society. One letter to The Independent argues that, ‘Respect 
for other faiths is the basis of civilised society, particularly when we are living in an 
increasingly multi-faith and multi-cultural world where peace and harmony can only 
be achieved through understanding the sensitivities of others’ (Malik, 2006).3 On the 
other hand, some examples of the reading express threats. For example, Robert Fisk 
reports how: 
The Islamic Army in Iraq, one of the main insurgent groups, made a 
blood-curdling call yesterday for violence against citizens of countries 
where caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed had been published. ‘We 
swear to God, if we catch one of their citizens in Iraq, we will cut him 
to pieces, to take revenge for Prophet,’ it said in an unverified internet 
statement [sic]. (Fisk, 2006) 
While the Islamic Army in Iraq is not necessarily a fundamentalist organization, it is 
a violent one, and this reaction to the cartoons, and other threats of violence, represent 
a response that echoes the stated meaning. Most commentators suggest that it would 
be a retrograde and authoritarian act to reinstate blasphemy as a serious offence. As 
such, other grounds of complaint are called upon to render criticism of the cartoons, 
or to reformulate the charge of blasphemy. 
Islamophobia and Racism 
The dominant sociological critique of the cartoons argues that they are culturally 
racist and an example of Islamophobia. The culturally racist reading is not one that is 
widely articulated in the media; in fact, it is an important point that most protests 
against the cartoons do not say that the cartoons are racist. This idea emerges in 
academia and is dependent on the concept of Islamophobia. An initial incoherence in 
this argument is that it forms an example of sociological mistranslation: the 
application of ill-fitting sociological categories to discourse that expresses outrage 
with quite different terms and concepts. So, for example, Hansen, in a survey of 113 
newspaper articles, found that ‘Of those who took a position, 58 (43%) argued that 
the cartoons were offensive to Islam, while seven (5%) said they were both offensive 
to Islam and racist’ (Hansen, 2006b: 49). Racism does not appear from the outset to 
be the major cause of complaint. This does not discount that the cartoons may be 
motivated by, and create, anti-Muslim racism but it does suggest that anti-racism may 
not be the only motive for reaction – thus highlighting the liquidity of the cartoons. 
Islamophobia sees the religion of the Muslim as ‘other’. As Modood (2005a: 11) 
outlines, ‘religion can be the basis of racialisation as long as the religion of a group 
can be linked to physical ancestry and descent’. Incompatibility with European 
culture is also regularly cited as a characteristic of Islam by Islamophobes (Balibar, 
1991: 24). Anti-Muslim and anti-Asian racism exists and should be taken seriously 
and this also involves a rigorous approach to the concepts used in identifying it. 
‘Islamophobia’ is a contested term and one critiqued as too broad (Halliday, 1999). 
Importantly, to describe cultural racism as new or more sophisticated is to describe it 
as increasingly polysemic. Islamophobia is a racism that often exhibits the coding, 
ambiguity or polysemia common in cultural racism. As Rattansi (2007: 111) states ‘ 
“Islamophobia” or any other kind of hostility to Islam and Muslims is not necessarily 
racist, but in many contexts can take a relatively “strong” or “hard” racist form.’ This 
is further complicated when combined with the ambiguity of the cartoons. 
The idea that the cartoons stereotype Muslims or are Islamophobic appears in some 
press comment. One in The Independent expresses this: ‘As there is no suggestion in 
history that he was a terrorist, the figure is clearly a proxy for all Muslims’ (Shamsad, 
2006). Another argues: 
To imply that his teachings legitimate terrorist activities is in itself a 
deliberate act of incitement to hatred. The purpose behind the 
publication and re-publication of the cartoons was deliberate 
provocation, based on a belief that Muslims are fair targets for any 
kind of insults. (Hasan, 2006) 
The idea that the cartoons represent a deliberate act of provocation, that they are 
clearly a proxy for all Muslims, that this is the intended and only meaning, is 
impossible to sustain. It is clearly one reading, but not the only one, and so highlights 
the liquid aspect of the debate. Importantly, the cartoons allow, because of their 
incongruity, for Islamophobia to be implied in readings of them. Paradoxically, this 
implication fails to allow for clear or serious racist intent to be proven. 
Sociological accounts have developed the racist reading. Modood suggests: 
. . . the cartoons are not just about one individual but about Muslims 
per se – just as a cartoon portraying Moses as a crooked financier 
would not be about one man but a comment on Jews. And just as the 
latter would be racist, so are the cartoons in question. (Modood, 
2006a: 1) 
Analogies between the Prophet Muhammad cartoons and various examples of anti-
Semitism or anti-Semitic cartoons highlight that religious groups can be racialized. 
Modood’s example makes clear that to see Islam and terrorism as inherently 
connected is a cultural stereotype and thus culturally racist but it does not prove that 
the ‘Muslim terrorist’ is socially and historically entrenched in the same way as the 
‘rich crooked Jew’. The analogy rhetorically draws on anti-Semitism for support and 
invokes the image of pre-Second World War anti-Semitic stereotyping. Perhaps the 
most problematic aspect of this comparison is the implicit assertion that western 
European anti-Muslim racism has, in recent history, impacted on Muslims in the same 
way that anti-Semitism impacted on Jews. Moreover, the analogy also erases the 
reality of European Islamic fundamentalism, which is often seen as a legitimate target 
for satire. 
That said, an anti-Muslim racist reading of the cartoons has been developed by the 
British National Party, who use it for supporting culturally racist ideology. In this 
case the cartoons are used as a signifier of all Muslims and are situated as a way of 
expressing proteophobia. Robert Verkaik reports that, ‘The British National Party has 
published some of the cartoons on its website. “British newspapers have united in 
their cowardice by refusing to carry the cartoons which have caused a storm of protest 
and anger amongst the Muslim world”, read the accompanying statement’ (Verkaik, 
2006). The BNP was reported to have used one of the cartoons in the May 2006 local 
authority elections, as Andrew Grice writes that the BNP ‘will include in its campaign 
material one of the cartoons which sparked outrage among Muslims across the world, 
showing the Prophet Mohamed with a bomb in his turban’ (Grice, 2006). Such uses 
confirm the ambiguity of the images and the necessary rigidity of the reader who can 
‘overcome’ this. The power of the cartoons lies in the distortions created. The 
cartoons generate a form of liquid racism that requires the addition, consumption and 
subsequent negation of the other readings in order to sustain its persuasiveness. 
Satire and the Defence of Free Speech 
In defining satire, Stott (2005: 109) states that it ‘aims to denounce folly and vice and 
urge ethical and political reform through the subjection of ideas to humorous 
analysis’. This presents the idea that humour is able to analyse serious events in a 
particular way. As stated, it might represent the partisan ridicule of a political position 
and a rhetorical expression of ideology, as ethics are rarely objective. It also points to 
the specific semantic alienation of the object of humour – through the creation of a 
separation between self-definition and definition through ridicule. Griffin (1994: 37) 
adds a similar comment: ‘satire works like the preacher-rhetorician to persuade his 
audience to virtue’. I have explained that the specific targets of the cartoons are 
ambiguous. Contrary to this, for example, Sardar (2006: 1) argues: ‘A cartoon is a 
satiric device. Satire holds a mirror to the powerful, speaking truth to power. But 
European Muslims can hardly be described as powerful.’ This firmly sees the 
cartoons through the culturally racist lens, but if one takes the target to be Islamic 
fundamentalism, then they do have a satirical and ethical reading. It seems, then, that 
the targets of the cartoons are multiple, and thus, so are the ethical impacts. 
It is hardly a new phenomenon for satire to be offensive to its target and cause 
outrage. For example, Stott (2005: 106) explains that in Aristophanes’ comedy: 
‘Abuse that we would now consider libellous was a fundamental part of comedy.’ 
Following the trend of offensiveness, Greek satire became influential in the 18th 
century as ‘English authors rediscovered satirical models as a powerful form of social 
commentary’ (Stott, 2005: 112). Many of the examples in Gatrell’s (2006) City of 
Laughter show the insulting nature of London’s 18th-century satire. It is the 
stretching of incongruity in satire that encourages the ridiculous meaning. Hence, sat-
ire is never nice, gentlemanly or civil, and has frequently encouraged the authoritarian 
response of reaching for the censor’s mark. 
Returning to the Prophet Muhammad cartoons, on the satirical side of the coin (or 
incongruity) is the liberal secular reading and defence of freedom of speech, which is 
also a defence of satire. The stated meaning of the cartoons, summarized as a 
comment on Islamic fundamentalism and a defence of freedom of speech in reaction 
to self-censorship, was, in the proceeding debates, championed by a number of 
writers and journalists. Some of these do acknowledge that the cartoons may be 
genuinely offensive to Muslims, but very few touch on the issue of racism in any 
depth. Johann Hari exemplifies this position: 
Surely the only position for a liberal and a democrat to take is to rally 
to the side of the cartoonists? . . . free speech is not freedom to be nice. 
It is freedom to be offensive, foolish or even racist, or it is nothing. 
(Hari, 2006a) 
As his argument develops, the defence becomes more determined: 
A poisonous cliché sprang up: that this is a fight between ‘Liberal 
fundamentalists’ and Islamic fundamentalists, two equally extreme 
sides that reasonable people should reject. Do these people really 
believe there is a moral equivalence between a system of free speech 
that protects everyone, Muslims included, and a superstitious taboo 
that proposes to erect a wall around one man and silence all criticism 
of him? (Hari, 2006a) 
The liberal secular reading develops from the stated meaning. By denying concern for 
the interpretation of the cartoons, it becomes a defence of principle that attempts to 
position itself externally to the meanings that are created by the cartoons. The second 
quote emphasizes this, as Hari begins to give normative judgement on the wider 
arguments. Later he comments on the London demonstration against the cartoons: 
This year, London has seen more than one mass rally in favour of 
censorship. The enemies of free speech recur throughout the ages, 
appalled by Michelangelo, Galileo, DH Lawrence . . . and today, it is 
cartoon depictions of Mohamed that stoke their rage. Tomorrow it will 
be something else, perhaps something you love. (Hari, 2006b) 
This view is supported in many commentaries: for example, Greg Dyke offers a 
viewpoint on why the British press had not reproduced the cartoons, through 
recounting comments made by Salman Rushdie: 
He told us that our tolerant liberal society which we had fought to 
establish over centuries, was in danger of being destroyed from within 
because that very tolerance meant we tolerated people who didn’t 
share those same values and, as a result, they would undermine them. I 
have a horrible feeling that this is what is happening today. (Dyke, 
2006) 
These debates assert the defence of a principle – freedom of speech. Being directly 
caught up in the unfolding discourse and characteristic of journalistic commentary, 
where opinion is paramount, there is little attempt to say anything about the way in 
which the debates have developed as a direct result of the semantic structure of the 
cartoons, thus they perpetuate the liquid aspects of the debate. Certainly the debates 
capture important points but many become as entrenched as the other positions do. In 
doing so they tend to forgo discussions of categories of ‘free’ and ‘hate’ speech, in 
relation to racism and the cartoons, that might highlight unacknowledged 
contradictions in their discursive positioning. 
Postmodernity and Fundamentalism 
There is . . . a specifically postmodern form of religion, born of the 
internal contradiction of postmodern life, of the specifically 
postmodern form in which the sufficiency of man and the banality of 
dreams to take human fate under human control are revealed. This 
form has come to be known under the English name of 
fundamentalism. (Bauman, 1997: 182; emphasis in the original) 
There is a postmodern tendency at work in the cartoons controversy. Readings of the 
cartoons become fixed when the position of the reader becomes entrenched, or at a 
more extreme level, fundamentalist. This was evident in the BNP’s use of the 
cartoons and in the violent reactions towards non-Muslim Europeans from some 
Muslims. 
While the BNP’s use of the cartoons encourages racism, there was also an ostensive 
display of anti-European hatred expressed in the violent protest surrounding the 
cartoons. For example, Hansen (2006a: 9) states that ‘On 30 January, armed gunmen 
in the Gaza strip stormed the European Union office in Gaza, threatening to kidnap 
the workers unless the EU issued an official apology. Hamas’s leaders demanded that 
Denmark punish the cartoonists and Jyllands-Posten.’ Further to this, in Europe there 
were also expressions of violent intent: 
Demonstrations were organised outside the Danish embassy in 
London, during which radical Islamists brandished placards stating: 
‘Slay [also butcher/massacre/behead/ exterminate] those who insult 
Islam’, ‘Free speech go to hell’, ‘Europe is the cancer and Islam is the 
cure’, and ‘Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way’. (Hansen, 2006a: 
10) 
An organizer at the London protest, Umran Javed, was later found guilty of inciting 
racial hatred. Shenai Raif reports that ‘He was said to have shouted: “Bomb, Bomb 
Denmark, Bomb, bomb, USA” ’ (Raif, 2007). What is significant is that the vitriol 
generated in these reactions is in response to a series of ambiguous cartoons. This is a 
fundamentalist reaction to liquid racism. 
Bauman argues that fundamentalism, both religious and non-religious, is a tendency 
that is a specific product of postmodernity. He suggests, 
. . . fundamentalism is the supreme (though radically simplified) 
embodiment of a tendency aided and abetted by the whole thrust of 
postmodern culture. One may conclude that religious fundamentalism 
is a legitimate child of postmodernity, born of its joys and torments, 
and heir to its achievements and worries alike. (Bauman, 1997: 184) 
Bauman sees postmodernity as a period in which there is a notable and significant 
increase in the occurrence and experience of ambivalence, instability, liquidity and 
the predictable anxiety that results from this. The postmodern condition is also said to 
lead to an increase in individualism, both chosen and prescribed. Bauman argues that 
‘ “Fundamentalism”, choosing to hold fast to inherited and/or ascribed identity, is a 
natural and legitimate offspring of planet-wide enforced individualisation’ (Bauman, 
2005: 27). Fundamentalism is, therefore, a reaction to an ambivalent world and an 
attempted reordering of that world through its reinscription.4 Following this rationale, 
fundamentalism has, for Bauman, an equivalent relationship to ambivalence as 
fascism. Hence, he argues that ‘religious fundamentalism belongs to a wider family of 
totalitarian or proto-totalitarian solutions offered to all those who find the burden of 
individual freedom excessive and unbearable’, that it ‘is an offer of an alternative 
rationality’ (Bauman, 1997: 184, 185; emphasis in the original). The cartoons, when 
viewed through a fundamentalist lens, become the ambiguous, non-literal antithesis of 
that identity. The ambivalence feeds fundamentalism as the very thing that it cannot 
stand and wishes to remove from the world. This reverses the pattern found around 
traditional racist humour, where rather than it being a discourse of hatred of the 
‘other’ that forms the impetus for joke creation, hatred is expressed as outrage 
towards the created incongruity (Weaver, 2007).  
The Prophet Muhammad cartoons have an ambiguous and liquid form. It is the 
incongruity, in addition to the complexity of the political debates, that construct the 
nucleus of this liquidity. They are, therefore, an article of culture that one might, quite 
fairly, be ambivalent about, especially when we are discussing the serious arguments 
of what they are really intended to mean, and what should be done with them. This 
article demonstrates that further discussion and investigation of polysemia, 
ambivalence and racism, especially cultural racism, now seems necessary and urgent. 
Conclusion 
The article has highlighted the development of liquid racism – a racism of ambiguous 
cultural signs that encourages the development of entrenched socio-discursive 
positioning when reading these signs. Examples of entrenched positioning have been 
drawn from four perspectives that encompass the stated meaning, complaints of 
blasphemy, complaints of racism and a defence of satire and freedom of speech. The 
concept of liquid racism should allow us to identify racism where the sign-systems 
that make it up are entwined with not just the ambivalence of racist subjectivity but 
also an assemblage of issues, perspectives and contexts of reading. It is certainly 
important for the sociology of race and ethnicity to gauge this complexity and to hope 
to do more than (re)produce shouting matches with inflexible concepts. Further 
research may also highlight other examples of liquid racism alongside the continued 
existence of older formations. 
The Prophet Muhammad cartoons are an ambiguous form and there is no one true 
or correct reading of them. This structural ambiguity does not preclude them from 
producing racist readings. They also have the ability to provoke fascist or 
fundamentalist responses. Such complexity shows that liquid racism does not signify 
an unimportant racism or a racism less serious than traditional forms. It is serious 
because it signifies the paradox that a war of words over what they mean and whether 
they should be condemned will ignite rather than defuse the volatility of ambiguous 
images. 
Notes 
I wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the 
article. Thanks also to Michael Pickering for his useful comments, and to Gregor 
McLennan and Thomas Osborne for guidance on an earlier version. The article was 
finalised during an ESRC funded Postdoctoral Fellowship (PTA-026-27-2168). 
1. Overall, there is no substantive difference between Bauman’s definitions of 
postmodernity and liquid modernity – apart from the metaphorical potential of the 
term ‘liquid’ – which is unquestionably his dominant argumentative technique. I 
maintain a use of postmodernity but draw on the metaphor of liquidity in describing 
certain socio-discursive formations. 
2. Fundamentalism (Islamic and other forms) is defined as an appeal ‘to the inerrancy of 
sacred texts to legitimate conceptions of purity’ (Springett, 2003: 325). It is also a 
fixation on ‘society’s desertion of eternally valid, divinely revealed and textually 
literal received principles of order’ (Riesbrodt, 1993: 16, cited in Springett, 2003: 
328–9). Such cultural discursive interpretations are not always linked to violent 
activity. 
3. Letters to the editors of daily newspapers have been included in the analysis because, 
while differing greatly from reportage, press commentary and academic publications 
on a number of levels, they provide excellent examples of the liquid readings of the 
cartoons. They often very clearly express the polarity or specificity of the forms of 
reaction provoked by liquid racism. 
4. See also Springett (2003) for a commensurate psychoanalytic account of anxiety, 
ambivalence and the resulting discursive fixity in all religious fundamentalisms, and 
sociological accounts of the reordering, reactive and monosemic characteristics of 
Islamic fundamentalism (Alam, 2007: 32; Brighton, 2007: 13). 
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